{"id":55493,"date":"2023-05-23T18:21:32","date_gmt":"2023-05-23T18:21:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org\/?p=55493"},"modified":"2026-05-05T23:24:31","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T23:24:31","slug":"beyond-adaptation-coming-to-terms-with-loss-damage","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.climatepolicyinitiative.org\/pt-br\/beyond-adaptation-coming-to-terms-with-loss-damage\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cBeyond Adaptation\u201d: Coming to Terms with Loss & Damage"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Originally conceptualized by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in 1991, the policy agenda regarding loss & damage has been characterized by considerable ambiguity, complexity, and controversy as various actors have opined on the normative question: who should be held to account for the losses and damages associated with anthropogenic climate change, and on what basis? Coloring this difficult question is the troubling reality that people who contributed least to the problem are those first and most adversely affected by it.[1]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

With countries formally, and finally, recognizing the need for loss & damage finance at COP27, the coming years will demand a \u201cmosaic of solutions\u201d to put this policy agenda into practice, leaving less room to sidestep the issue, as has been the case in the past. This blog seeks to unpack the loss & damage policy-finance agenda, reflecting on how we could, or should, define it from a climate finance tracking perspective. Definitional clarity is now an essential prerequisite for turning the Breakthrough Agreement<\/a> into breakthrough action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While loss & damage (hereafter L&D) continues to be interpreted differently by different actors, on certain points a (general) consensus has emerged:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. Losses and damages can be categorized as either economic <\/strong>(those for which a monetary value is easily given), for example, loss of income and damage to assets; or non-economic <\/strong>(those for which a monetary value is not easily, or meaningfully, given), for example, loss of life and damage to cultural identity.<\/li>
  2. Losses and damages can arise from both chronic<\/strong> (slow-onset) events<\/strong> (for example, sea-level rise or glacial retreat) and acute<\/strong> (extreme) events<\/strong> (for example, flooding or drought).<\/li>
  3. L&D can be considered the third pillar<\/strong> of climate action; that is, where (i)<\/strong> mitigation is insufficient and (ii)<\/strong> adaptation inadequate (iii)<\/strong> loss & damage ensues (Broberg & Romera, 2020).<\/li>
  4. L&D, therefore, lies \u201cbeyond adaptation<\/strong>;\u201d that is, where the limits \u2013 either soft or hard \u2013 to adaptation are reached and climate risks become unavoided<\/strong> (they could, in theory, be avoided but will not be due to some constraint) or unavoidable<\/strong> (Mechler et al<\/em>., 2019).<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Given points 3 and 4, and in light of the Paris Agreement which explicitly separates adaptation (Article 7) from L&D (Article 8), efforts should be channelled into determining, in practical terms, how the boundaries between these concepts can be established. Based on CPI\u2019s experience in tracking adaptation finance, I propose that the following points concerning temporality <\/em>and typology<\/em> are considered in, or inform, efforts to delineate between adaptation finance and L&D finance:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Temporality<\/strong>: the \u201cwhen\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n